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What Do Economic Models
Tell Us About the Effects of
the U.S,~CanadaFree Trade
Agreement?
i~!ITUDIESOF THE historic U.S-Canada Free
Trade Agreement have produced conflicting
estimates of its economic effects.1 Not surpris-
ingly, the numerous changes resulting from the
Free Trade Agreement will benefit some people
and harm others. To summarize the agreement’s
effects, many studies have estimated the mini-
mum amount that individuals who gain would
be willing to accept to forego the changes and
the maximum that those who lose would be
willing to pay to prevent them.2 Subtracting the
value of the losses from the gains produces a
measure of net national welfare change. Using
such a measure, estimates for Canada, expressed
as a percentage of total economic activity, range
from large gains to small losses, while estimates
for the United States range from small gains to
small losses.
This paper closely examines five recent studies
to better understand their estimates as well as
identify why they contradict each other. While
the five studies focus on the U.S-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, they represent the typical
modeling approaches used to quantify the impact
of changes in trade laws. Thus, the following
discussion helps explain why these analyses
often reach widely different conclusions about
the same trade policy change. In addition, the
discussion points out some limitations of these
kinds of analyses.
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To assess the results and limitations of the dif-
ferent studies, the key aspects of the U.S-Canada
Free Trade Agreement first must be identified.
The agreement, summarized in table 1, estab-
1See Coughlin et al. (1988) for an introduction to the
theoretical arguments underlying protectionist trade
policies and the empirical evidence indicating that the
costs borne by consumers of such policies generally far
exceed the benefits captured by domestic producers and
government.
2lhis measure of welfare change is called an equivalent in-
come variation. For a brief discussion of this measure, see
Henderson and Quandt (1980).441
Table 1 (continued)
The Major Provisions of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
Financial Exempts U.S. bank subsidianes in Canada from Canada’s 16 percent ceiling
services on assets of foreign banks. Ends Canada’s foreign ownership restriction on U.S
purchases of shares in federally regulated insurance and trust companies
Reviews U.S. firms’ applications for entry into Canadian financial markets on
the same basis as Canadian firms’ applications. Permits banks in the U.S to
underwrite and deal in debt securities fully backed by the Government of
Canada or political subdivisions Guarantees continuation of multi-state bran-
ches of Canadian banks.
General dispute Establishes a binational commission to resolve disagreements (except for finan-
settlement cial services and countervailing duty and anti-dumping duty cases).
Countervailing Allows countries to continue to apply existing national laws Replaces
duty and anti- court review with a binational panel (when requested)! which must apply
dumping dispute national law in rendering decisions under international law.
settlement
Softwood Preserves the 1986 agreement with Canada on provincial pricing practices.
lumber
Culture Exempts cultural industries from the Free Trade Agreement, but authorizes
measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions otherwise in-
consistent with the Agreement. Cultural activities exempted include the publica-
tion, sale, distribution or exhibition of books, magazines and newspapers; recor-
ding of all kinds: and radio, television and cable dissemination.
SOURCE: U.S Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Summary ofthe U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (February 1988).
lishes a free trade area to be phased in between which virtually all tariffs on bilateral trade were
January 1, 1989, and January 1, 1998.~By that removed previously. Some of the tariffs listed in
time, the United States and Canada will have table 2 have already been eliminated, some will
eliminated nearly all of the barriers restricting be eliminated in five equal reductions (20 per-
trade in goods and services between each other, cent per year) on each January 1 beginning in
while retaining their individual trade policies 1989 and the remainder will be eliminated in 10
with all other countries,~ equal reductions (10 percent per yearL~
The agreement is not limited to tariff barriers.
Virtually all import and export restrictions, such
By January 1, 1998, all tariffs on merchandise as import quotas and embargoes, have been
trade between the United States and Canada eliminated. Less visible trade barriers have been
will be eliminated. As table 2 reveals, prior to eliminated as well. For example, in government
the agreement, U.S. tariff rates on imports from procurement, discrimination between U.S. and
Canada were lower than Canadian tariffs on im- Canadian suppliers is prohibited on qualifying
ports from the United States in every industry nonmilitary purchases exceeding $25,000, as
except transportation equipment, an industry in defined in the General Agreement on Tariffs
3See Little (1988), Copeland (1989) and the U.S. Depart- abolished trade barriers among themselves and have the
ment of Commerce (1988) for summaries of the agree- same trade barriers on imports from non-member coun-
ment. tries.
4The retention of individual trade policies relative to non- 5According to the U.S. International Trade Commission
partner countries distinguishes a free trade agreement (1990), requests from traders on both sides have prompted
from a customs union. The countries in a customs union, tariffs on more than 400 products to be eliminated more
such as the pre-1992” European Community, have quickly than was originally agreed upon.Table 2
Average Post-Tokyo Round Tariff Rates of the United States
and Canada’
Canadian
U.S. tariff rates tariff rates
Industry on imports from on imports from
Canada Other United States Other
Agriculture 1.6% 1.8% 2.2°/s 1.8°/c
Food 3.8 4.8 5.4 6.1
Textiles 7.2 9.1 16.9 16.4
Clothing 18.4 21 6 23.7 22.1
Leather products 2 5 3.8 40 6.7
Footwear 9.0 8.9 21.5 21.9
Wood products 0.2 38 2.5 4.9
Furniture and fixtures 4.6 29 14.3 14 1
Paper products 0.0 1.3 6 6 6.5
Printing and publishing 0.3 0.7 1.1 1 0
Chemicals 0.6 3.5 7.9 7.0
Petroleum products 0.0 0.1 0.4 0 1
Rubber products 3.2 2.0 7.3 6.0
Nonmetal mineral products 0.3 7.2 44 8.5
Glass products 5.7 5.8 6.9 7.9
Iron and steel 2.7 3.9 5.1 55
Nonferrous metals 05 0.8 3.3 2.7
Metal products 40 4.4 8.6 8.9
Nonelectric machinery 2.2 3 2 4.6 48
Electric machinery 4.5 4.1 75 7.1
Transportation equipment 0.0 2.5 00 2.5
Miscellaneous manufactures 0.9 2.0 5.0 5.3
Average 0.7 4.3 3 8 7.4
Weighted by bilateral trade.
SOURCE: Brown. Drusilla K. and Robert M. Stern. A Modeling Perspective.” in Robert M
Stern. Philip H. Trezise and John Whalley. eds. Perspectives on a U.S-Canadian Free
Trade Agreement (The Brookings Institution, 1987).
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by rebating duties (taxes) paid on parts im-
ported to Canada when these parts, after some
production activity, were then exported. All
Canadian duty remission programs will be ter-
minated by 1998. Until then, the agreement
does not change the rules for companies already
qualifying for duty-free imports into Canada
under the existing auto agreement, although it
does not allow any new firms to qualify.
Most trade restrictions on energy resources
are prohibited. The exceptions are limited to
cases of shortages, conservation or national
security; however, even in the case of short-
ages, the reduced supplies must be shared be-
tween both countries.
Trade barriers on alcoholic beverages have
been only partially eliminated. Although the
agreement eliminates some barriers limiting the
trade of wines and distilled spirits, Canadian
barriers limiting the importation of U.S. beer
will remain unchanged.7
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The agreement provides national treatment
for all aspects of the establishment and opera-
tion of businesses. This means that U.S-owned
firms in Canada and Canadian-owned firms in
the United States will be treated as domestic
firms. The agreement addresses U.S. concerns
about Canadian policies designed to influence
foreign investment. Specifically, Canada agreed
to stop imposing performance requirements,
such as requiring an investor to export a cer-
tain amount of goods, and) beginning in 1992,
to stop screening U.S. direct acquisitions of
Canadian assets of less than C$150 million (in
constant 1992 Canadian dollars).
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The concept of national treatment has been
extended to financial services, making this the
first time that the United States has reached a
bilateral agreement covering all financial ser-
vices. Virtually all discriminatory Canadian prac-
tices are eliminated. For example, the Canadian
assets of foreign bank subsidiaries operating in
Canada previously were limited to no more than
16 percent of all domestic assets of the Cana-
dian banking system. Under the agreement, U.S.
bank subsidiaries are no longer subject to this
limitation on their market share.
OUi~er!ervu~aa
The agreement is also noteworthy because it
is the first international agreement dealing with
trade and investment barriers in the service in-
dustries. Many service industries such as trans-
portation, basic telecommunications, health,
education and social services, however, are not
covered. Nonetheless, the principle of national
treatment has been extended to most commer-
cial services such as construction, tourism, com-
puter services, wholesale and retail trade, man-
agement services and other business services.
Since many of these require the movement of
personnel for limited periods, the agreement




The Canada-United States Trade Commission
has been established to implement the agree-
ment. This group will resolve disputes on all
matters except financial services and those in-
volving charges of either foreign government
export subsidies, called countervailing duty
cases, or sales of a good abroad at a price lower
than is charged in the domestic market, called
anti-dumping cases. Disputes involving financial
services will be handled by a formal consulta-
tive mechanism between the U.S. Department of
the Treasury and the Canadian Department of
Finance. Countervailing duty and anti-dumping
cases are subject to review, upon request, by a
special binational panel!’ This panel, whose deci-
sion is final, reviews the case in light of the
domestic laws of the importing country. Thus,





The preceding overview identifies the many
legislative changes. Researchers attempting to
7For additional information on U.S-Canada beer trade, see
Carter et am. (1989).
8The agreement’s resolution of countervailing duty and anti-
dumping cases is temporary. The United States and
Canada have five to seven years to develop a permanent
solution; otherwise, either country may terminate the
agreement.
K Cil~-estimate their likely consequences face numerous
issues involving economic theory, modeling ap-
proaches and measurement. While economic
theory provides much assistance in modeling
the effects of the agreement, it provides no
definitive conclusion about the welfare conse-
quences for a specific country. One aspect of
the modeling process in which economic theory
plays an important role is in the selection of the
modeling approach. No matter which approach
is chosen, the far-reaching nature of the agree-
ment prevents some aspects from being incor-
porated into quantitative models - The wide
range of trade barriers affected by the agree-
ment poses further problems. To understand
fullythe usefulness of the studies discussed later,
these underlying issues are examined below.
International trade theory generally concludes
that free trade leads to the most efficient utiliz-
ation of the world’s resources and, consequent-
ly, maximizes the value of world output. Every
move toward freer trade, such as the elimina-
tion of trade barriers among a group of coun-
tries, however, does not necessarily increase na-
tional welfare!’ The reason for this apparent
contradiction is that the formation of a free
trade area, while eliminating one trade distor-
tion, creates another. The tariff reduction
resulting from a free trade agreement will elimi-
nate the distortion between domestic goods and
imports from the partner country, a change that
increases national welfare. A new distortion,
however, is created between imports from the
partner country and those from non-partner
countries that reduces welfare.
These opposing welfare effects, illustrated in
the shaded insert on pages 47-50, can be de-
scribed very simply. If the formation of a free
trade area results in the domestic production of
some goods and services in one member coun-
try being replaced by imports of these goods
and services from other member countries, then
the greater specialization in production based
on comparative advantage will enhance the eco-
nomic welfare of the member countries. The
term for this welfare-increasing reallocation of
production is “trade creation.”
“Trade diversion,” however, occurs when
lower-cost imports from outside the free trade
area are replaced by imports produced at higher
cost from a member country. This can occur
because goods imported from a member are not
subject to tariffs or other restrictions, while
goods potentially imported from non-member
countries continue to face the same barriers as
before. This trade diversion shifts production
away from the pattern consistent with com-
parative advantage.b0
The relative magnitudes of trade creation and
trade diversion determine whether the welfare
of members rises or falls. Thus, it is natural to
use quantitative models to assist in assessing
whether the agreement is likely to be beneficial
or harmful to the two countries.
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The standard way to model the effects of in-
ternational trade policy changes is to construct
and solve a theoretical model using assumed
values of critical parameters to derive the solu-
tion. General equilibrium models usually are
chosen to capture the numerous market interac-
tions that take place both within and among
countries. Thus, the standard model used for
this purpose is called an “applied general equi-
librium model.”
Equilibrium in this type of model is character-
ized by a set of prices such that the market de-
mand for each output and input equals the mar-
ket supply. The market supply for each output
reflects the production decisions of firms moti-
vated by profit maximization. Input demand
‘Viner (1950) showed that the formation of a customs union
could have different welfare effects for partner as well as
non-partner countries. Viner’s finding is an example of the
“theory of the second best.” This theory shows that, if all
conditions required to maximize welfare are not satisfied,
then satisfying one or more additional conditions will not
necessarily produce a higher level of welfare.
‘°Theempirical importance of trade diversion for Canada
can be doubted because, prior to the agreement, the ma-
jority of Canadian imports—more than 71 percent in 1986,
according to the Council of Economic Advisers (1988)—
were already provided by the United States. Thus, the
chances that the share of Canadian imports provided by
the United States would rise substantially are small. Note
also that information contained in table 2 shows that
average Canadian tariff rates on imports from the United
States already were below those on imports from other
countries.
115ee Shoven and Whalley (1984) for an introduction to ap-
plied generam equilibrium models. This introduction
hightights how these models work using a numerical ex-
ample. In addition, they provide a review of research using
these models to examine international trade issues.‘4K
functions are derived from production functions
that use only capital and labor. The market de-
mand for each product in this model reflects
utility-maximizing consumption decisions of in-
dividuals. Demand functions are derived from
maximizing utility functions subject to a budget
constraint. The budget constraint contains a
measure of income generated through the sup-
ply of inputs that are used in the production
process.
Values for parameters in the production and
utility functions must be specified to solve such
a model. For example, the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and labor in the produc-
tion function, as well as that between goods in
the utility function, must be specified.’2 The
solution to the model, characterized by the
market prices of the inputs and outputs and the
corresponding quantities, ensures that market
demand equals market supply for all inputs and
outputs and that profits are zero in each in-
dustry. There are major differences, however,
among models that fall into this category. The
estimates discussed below rely on one of two
fundamental theoretical approaches.
The traditional approach focuses on the gains
from comparative advantage. A key assumption
in the comparative advantage approach is that
markets are competitive. Using the Heckscher-
Ohlin approach to international trade, produc-
tion costs vary across countries prior to interna-
tional trade because of differences in the en-
dowments of productive resources. Countries
relatively well-endowed with certain resources
are able to produce those goods whose produc-
tion requires relatively large amounts of these
resources at lower cost than other countries.
\%Tith free trade, countries gain by exchanging
export goods that they produce at relatively
lower cost for imports produced at relatively
lower cost from other countries. In essence,
trade allows each country to export its abun-
dant productive resources in exchange for the
relatively abundant productive resources of its
trading partners. The existence of trade bar-
riers prevents some of the gains from produc-
ing, trading and consuming on the basis of com-
parative advantage from being realized.
The alternative approach used in estimating
the effects of the reduction of trade barriers ap-
plies standard models used in industrial organi-
zation to international trade. In this approach,
most output markets are assumed to be imper-
fectly competitive rather than perfectly com-
petitive. Frequently, the imperfectly competitive
markets result from the existence of economies
of scale in production. These economies of scale
cause declining average production costs as the
level of output expands. In this case, the in-
crease in the size of the market for individual
producers allows for gains from trade.’~
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Irrespective of the modeling approach chosen,
several features of the agreement are not quan-
tified.’4 Many of these features are potentially
important and, thus, could significantly alter the
agreement’s net impact.
One of the agreement’s goals is the creation of
a more stable business environment for all forms
of international business activity. Many Cana-
dians believe secure access to the U.S. market is
essential for Canadian economic prosperity, and
that such access is being threatened by the U.S.’
increasing use of trade laws for protectionist
reasons.” As an example justifying this concern,
Copeland (1989) notes that the United States
recently placed a 35 percent import duty on
Canadian shakes and shingles to protect U.S.
producers.
12The elasticity of input substitution is a measure of the
responsiveness of the optimal laborlcapital combination to
a change in the relative prices of these inputs. The
elasticity of substitution between goods is defined
analogously.
“The welfare consequences of economies of scale can be
negative. In models of trade between a large and a small
country, Markusen and Melvin (1981) and Ethier (1982)
show that the output of goods with increasing returns to
scale in the small country might decrease rather than in-
crease with a change from autarchy, a situation in which
the country engages in no international trade, to free
trade. The increase in average production costs in the
small country may more than offset the benefits of
specialization due to comparative advantage.
“Shea (1988) highlights similar aspects of the agreement
that are not quantified.
“See Lea (1987) and Trezise (1987) for assessments of the
Canadian perspective on this issue. The use of trade laws
for protectionist reasons is termed “contingent protection.”
Contingent protection encompasses a range of import
restrictions, such as anti-dumping and countervailing
duties, escape clause petitions and legislation dealing with
“unfair” international trade. Ethier (1988), p. 234, has
argued that the “use of the anti-dumping law has greatly
increased and the statute is likely to become a principal
protectionist tool,” while a recent article in The Economist
(October 22, 1988), p. 16, referred to the “capricious inter-
pretation and enforcement” of U.S. anti-dumping laws as
a potentially important trade barrier.47
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ment, the agreement set up a binational panel
to settle disputes in anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty cases Precisely how this panel will
function, however, is unknown; moreover, it is
virtually impossible to quantify the value of
trade currently foregone because of these legal
and political uncertainties that the agreement
will reduce.16
A second feature of the agreement that can-
not be quantified easily involves the consequen-
ces of the liberalized trade in services. Since
models typically view the service sector as pro-
ducing a non-traded service, they do not ana-
lyze explicitly the trade in services. Even if
models allowed for trade in services, however,
translating policies that discriminate against
trade in services into tariff measures would be
extremely difficult. Finally, it is hoped, especial-
ly in the United States, that the U5.-Canada
agreement of national treatment for service pro-
viders will encourage the current GATT negotia-
tions to reach a similar agreement in a multilat-
eral context- Though such an agreement would
have far-reaching consequences, these conse-
quences cannot be estimated in the context of
the U5-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
Because most economic models incorporate
the service sector, and all other sectors as well,
at aggregation levels that lump many industries
together, another problem is created. The costs
and benefits of the agreement tend to be under-
stated to an unknown degree; therefore, short
of disaggregating the model, there is no way to
tell precisely how much the costs or the benefits
have been understated.
For example, using a two-digit Standard In-
dustrial Classification scheme, transportation
equipment is treated as one industry. The agree-
ment, however, could cause one sector of tran-
sportation equipment to contract and another
sector to expand. The movement of workers
from the contracting to the expanding sector,
which entails temporary unemployment and
other costs for the affected workers, is not
captured by a model that treats transportation
equipment as a single industry.
On the other hand, this aggregation also un-
derestimates the benefits of the agreement.
1mAccording to the U.S. International Trade Commission
(1990), the dispute settlement process reached decisions
on two noncontroversial cases involving red raspberries
and paving equipment during 1989. Upcoming cases in-
volving steel rails and pork are expected to be controver-
sial. The amount of trade under dispute in all current
cases, which involve primarily agricultural commodities, is
less than 0.5 percent of the value of bilateral trade.
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result would be a monopolist who produces at an out-Highly aggregated models, by averaging tariff
rates across sectors within an industry, under-
represent the distortions caused by tariffs. In
other words, tariffs appear to distort relative
import prices by less than they actually do.’~
Eliminating these distortions is one source of
the gains from the agreement because produc-
tion and consumption decisions no longer will
be artificially distorted. Since the elimination
of larger distortions generates larger benefits,
highly aggregated models understate the bene-
fits associated with tariff reductions.
The models are also not well-suited to identify
the gains resulting from other possible effects
of the agreement. Positive effects can result
from the increased competition stemming from
reductions in trade barriers. When firms are in-
sulated from competition, they may not mini-
mize their production costs.18 When owners are
separated from managers, the absence of com-
petitive pressures may allow managers to incur
costs to achieve their own interests at the ex-
pense of reduced profits. The increase in com-
petitive pressures from increased international
trade increases the probability that production
costs will be minimized.
In addition, these firms might be pressured in-
to additional research and development expen-
ditures that generate either new products or
cost-saving production processes. The enlarge-
ment of the market might also attract new in-
vestment from non-partner countries. These
possibilities, which are potentially significant,
tend to be ignored by quantitative trade models.
Finally, all models share one other quantifica-
tion problem: how to incorporate the elimina-
tion of non-tariff barriers into the analysis. This
poses a problem because non-tariff barriers
must first be identified and, then, converted in-
to their tariff~equivalents.b9Even if a non-tariff
barrier can be identified, it is often difficult to
calculate its tariff-equivalent accurately. For ex-
ample, government procurement policies, a well-
known non-tariff barrier, are not easily con-
verted into an equivalent tariffs. As a result,
estimates of the effects of eliminating trade bar-
riers typically omit some non-tariff barriers. In
addition, estimates based on non-tariff barriers
must be viewed cautiously. Indeed, some re-
searchers ignore non-tariff barriers entirely and
simply report the consequences of eliminating
tariffs alone.
Models based on either the perfect competi-
tion/comparative advantage or the imperfect
competition approaches have been estimated to
identify the welfare consequences of ehminating
trade barriers in the agreement. To make the
discussion of the agreement’s overall effect on
the United States and Canada manageable, the
results of five recent studies are examined:
Hamilton and Whalley (1985), Brown and Stern
(1987 and 1989), Cox and Harris (1986) and
Wigle (1988). As table 3 shows, these studies ex-
emplify the different approaches and yield con-
flicting results. The studies by Hamilton and
Whalley, and Brown and Stern (1987) are based
on comparative advantage, while those by Cox
and Harris, Wigle, Brown and Stern (1989) are
based on imperfect competition.
The results conflict in terms of the gainers
and losers as well as the magnitudes of these
gains and losses. Depending on which study is
used, the results show both the United States
and Canada gaining, the United States losing
and Canada gaining or the United States gaining
and Canada losing. Relative to each country’s
gross domestic product, the welfare conse-
quences for the United States range from —003
17A simple example can illustrate this argument. Assume
two import-competing industries, each protected by an
average 5 percent tariff rate; thus, the relative price distor-
tions caused by the tariffs in each industry appear similar.
For one industry, however, the average 5 percent tariff
rate resutts from a 5 percent tariff rate for each sector. For
the other industry, the average results from averaging a 10
percent rate and a zero percent rate. The latter industry
has more distortions that the former because the differen-
tial tariff rates distort the relative prices across sectors.
The effect of aggregation is to treat every sector within an
industry as if it had the same level of protection from im-
port competition. Consequently, the gains from eliminating
the distortions within an industry are ignored. The higher
the level of aggregation, the more these distortions within
industries are ignored.
‘~Thispossibility, termed X-efficiency, has been stressed in
a more general context by Leibenstein (1980).
‘9The tariff-equivalent of a specific non-tariff barrier is the
tariff rate that would generate the same effect on the price
of the imported good as the non-tariff barrier. To illustrate,
assume first that world prices of sortie imported good are
fixed. Like a tariff, a non-tariff barrier causes the price of
the imported good to rise. A non-tariff barrier, such as a
quota, causes this price increase by reducing the supply
of imports. The percentage increase in the price of the im-
ported good is the tariff-equivalent. For many non-tariff
barriers, it is difficult to quantify the supply-reducing con-
sequences of the barriers.Table 3
Welfare Consequences of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, Selected Studies
Trade
Authors Modeltype barriers removed Unmted States’ Canada’
HamiltonlWhalley Perfect competition! All 003% 0 63%
(1985) comparative advantage Tarmffs —0 03 0.54
Brown/Stern (1987) Perfect competitronl All 1104 —0.35
comparatmve advantage
Cox/Harris (1988) Imperfect competition! All 8 74
economies of scate
Wmgle (1988) Imperfect competition! Tariffs (106 005
economies ofscale
Brown/Stern (1989) Imperfect competmtmon Tarrrfs 1109 1 00
1Thevalue ofthe welfare effect in each country, catcutated byan equivalent Income variation, msex
pressed as a percentage of gross domestic product.
/
Whether these changes seem large or small
depends on your point of view. Hamilton and
Whalley (1985), for example, found that the
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers in
creased U.S. welfare by only 0.03 percent of
~Gross domestic product is gross national product less net 21The disaggregation of imports of a product according to
property income from abroad. In 1987, Canadian gross their places of origin is called the Armington assumption.
domestic product was approximately 3 percent larger than For details, see Armington (1969).
gross national product, while U S. gross domestic product
was less than 1 percent smaller than gross national
product.
percent to 0.09 percent and for Canada, from
—0.35 percePt to 8.74 percent.2°
gross domestic product in 1977, which may
seem trivial. In dollar terms, however, the effect
could be called substantial. Using 1977 prices,
this rise in welfare is $0.6 billion. Using 1989
prices, the rise is $1.1 billion.
The conflicting and substantially divergent
results from these studies are due to a variety
of reasons. One key reason is that the values
chosen for the elasticities of substitution be-
tween capital and labor and between different
consumer goods vary across these studies. Table
4 lists several other characteristics that could
explain the conflicting findings. These include
the numbers of countries and goods, production
functions, market structure, how prices are set
and the mobility of resources. Some insights in-
to the importance of these differences are pro-
vided below
Hamilton and Whalley’s (1985) model departs
from the textbook comparative-advantage model
using the Heckscher-Ohlin approach in two
ways. First, demand and production function
parameters differ across countries and, second,
products are heterogeneous rather than homo-
geneous across countries.”
The differences in demand and production
function parameters across countries require
specific assumptions about the structure of
substitution possibilities for both demand and
production. The assumed values for the elastic-
ities of substitution in these functions
determine the price elasticities associated with
goods and factors of production. In turn, since
products are differentiated by the country in
which they are produced and their physical
characteristics, these elasticities of substitution
determine import and export demand elasticities
for each country as well. Not surprisingly, the
values chosen for these substitution elasticities
determine the results generated by the model,Table 4
Summary of Model Characteristics
Hamilton!Whalley Brown/Stern CoxiHarris Wigle Brown/Stern
Characteristic (1985) (1987) (1986) (1988) (1989)
Number of countries 8 43 8 4
Number of goods
Traded 5 22 29 5 22
Non-raded 1 70 1 7
Returns to scale
United States Constant Constant Not modeled Constant Constant





United States Perfect Perfect Not modeled Perfect Imperfect and
competition competition competition perfect competition
Canada Perfect Perfect Imperfect Imperfect Imperfect and





Price setting by None None Monopolistic Monopolistic Monopolistic
noncompetitive firms competition competition competition
and collusive and collusive
Labor mobility
Across industries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Internationally No No No No No
Capital mobility
Across industries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Internationally No Yes Yes No No
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in U.S. demand for some Canadian-produced
goods will increase the price of these goods in
Canada and the world market; this is another
change that benefits Canada. Thus, there are
beneficial and adverse terms-of-trade effects oc-
curring simultaneously.
The net welfare consequences for Canada and
the United States depend on the relative impor-
tance of these effects. From the Canadian per-
spective, the adverse terms-of-trade effects are
larger if Canada’s tariffs on U.S. exports are
higher on average than U.S. tariffs on Canadian
exports. This is, in fact, what is shown in table
2. Canadian terms of trade will also decline the
more (less) similar U.S. and Canadian goods are
to Canadian (U.S.) consumers.
Although Canada’s tariffs on U.S. exports be-
fore the agreement were higher on average
than U.S. tariffs on Canadian exports, Hamilton
and Whalley still find that the gains from the
agreement primarily accrue to Canada (see table
3). They attribute this finding to the fact that
Canada is the smaller partner. The smaller part-
ner’s production and consumption behavior are
less likely to affect world prices, enabling it to
take greater advantage of the trade diversion ef-
fects in the larger region.
Yet, using a model with features similar to
that used by Hamilton and Whalley, Brown and
Stern (1987) found that the United States gain-
ed, but Canada lost. As shown in table 3, the
bilateral removal of trade barriers by Canada
and the United States leads to an increase in
U.S. welfare, 0.04 percent of gross domestic
product, but a decrease in Canadian welfare,
0.35 percent of gross domestic product. Brown
and Stern argue that the reduction in Canadian
welfare stems from the relatively higher Cana-
dian tariff rate prior to the agreement. The
removal of this protection, which causes Cana-
dian consumers to substitute imported goods
from the United States for Canadian-produced
goods, leads to a reduction in the relative price
of Canadian goods.
Why do these two studies differ so much with
respect to the outcome for Canada? Brown and
Stern found their results were sensitive to the
assumptions about the elasticity of substitution
among imports from various sources. In other
words, the results were sensitive to the degree
of substitutability between U.S. imports from
Canada and the rest of the world and between
Canadian imports from the United States and
the rest of the world.
The greater the degree of substitutability, the
larger the U.S. gain and the smaller the Cana-
dian loss. If imports from various sources are
close substitutes, the preferential tariff reduc-
tion induces a substitution from third-country
suppliers to the partner. Relatively speaking, lit-
tle substitution out of the domestically produced
good occurs. As the demand for output from
the third-party countries declines, the terms of
trade for both Canada and the United States im-
proves. Even for very high assumed values for
the elasticity of substitution among imports,
however, Brown and Stern found a decline in
Canadian welfare.
Brown and Stern also examined whether the
decline in Canadian welfare was associated with
a movement of capital from Canada to the United
States; this possibility could not occur in Hamil-
ton and Whalley’s model. While Brown and Stern
did find a capital movement from Canada to the
United States, the Canadian welfare loss is near-
ly invariant to different assumptions about the
sensitivity of capital flows to U.S. and Canadian
rate-of-return differences -
Models based on comparative advantage as-
sume that all markets are perfectly competitive.
This assumption is inaccurate for many markets
in Canada. To address this issue and others, Cox
and Harris (1985) developed a general equili-
brium model of the Canadian economy that in-
corporates both economies of scale and im-
perfect competition.22 In a later paper, Cox and
Harris (1986) present estimates of economic ef-
fects of the Free Trade Agreement.
Wonnacott (1987) notes that the difference be-
tween many U.S. and Canadian manufacturing
22The model is not a complete general equilibrium model.
The two sectors foreign” to Canada, the United States
and all other countries in the rest of the world, are sum-
marized by exogenous import prices and a set of export
demand functions.operations has been a research topic for Cana-
dian economists since the mid-1960s. Canadian
manufacturers, especially those producing
consumer durables, have tended to produce a
wide range of products, each in relatively small
quantity. The standard explanation is that diver-
sified, small-scale production is caused by the
trade barriers of both countries.
Canadian trade barriers, by protecting domes-
tic producers from foreign competition, enable
Canadian firms to produce a variety of products
profitably, even though these products are ex-
pensive by international standards. Meanwhile,
U.S. trade barriers restrict Canadian access to
the U.S. market and, in turn, provide an incen-
tive for Canadian producers to focus on the
Canadian market.23 Thus, the reduction of tariff
barriers in the agreement should lead to ex-
panded production with lower per-unit costs.
The gains stemming from these changes are
called rationalization gains.
Cox and Harris’ modeling innovation was to
incorporate economies of scale into the analysis.
Production in each manufacturing industry is
assumed to be characterized by increasing re-
turns to scale, which results in lower per unit
average production costs as output increases.
Production in each non-manufacturing industry
is assumed to be characterized by constant re-
turns to scale.
Since non-competitive firms are price-searchers
and, hence, set their prices to maximize their
profits, assumptions about price-setting are re-
quired. Two price-setting hypotheses are used.
One is a monopolistic competitive pricing hy-
pothesis in which profit-maximizing firms set
the price of their products as a given mark-up
over their marginal cost of production. The size
of the mark-up depends on the price elasticity
of demand. The second hypothesis relies on a
collusive model in which all firms set their prices
equal to the world price plus the tariff.2~
Cox and Harris combine these hypotheses by
assuming that the actual prices are a weighted
average of the monopolistically competitive and
collusive prices. The set of these weighted prices
that clears both goods and factor markets is the
equilibrium set of prices for Canadian firms.
Irrespective of the pricing assumption, tariff
reductions increase import competition and,
thus, the prices of imported goods for Canadian
consumers tend to decline. For monopolistically
competitive firms, the increased competition
raises the elasticity of demand and, thereby,
reduces the mark-up over marginal cost. Simi-
larly, the collusive price declines because it is
set equal to the world price plus the shrinking
tariff. The resulting stimulation of Canadian
consumption is accompanied by an increase in
output by Canadian firms to satisfy the zero-
profit condition.25
Five sets of parameters, whose specific values
are based primarily on previous estimates in
other studies, are especially important in deter-
mining the equilibria.2G A set of export price
elasticities for Canadian firms is one set of para-
meters. The removal of U.S. tariffs on imports
from Canada eliminates the difference between
prices paid by U.S. consumers and prices re-
ceived by Canadian exporters. The removal of
U.S. tariffs tends not only to lower the prices
for U.S. consumers of imported goods from
Canada, but also to increase the prices received
by Canadian exporters. The extent of Canadian
penetration of the U.S. market depends on the
responsiveness of Canadian exports to these
price increases. Conversely, a set of Canadian
import price elasticities is needed to assess the
consequences of the reduction of Canadian
tariffs-
As suggested above, an assumption about the
weighting parameter is necessary to determine
whether prices tend to be set more according
to monopolistic or collusive behavior. The price-
setting behavior influences the degree of the
reallocation of productive resources that the
agreement causes.
Estimates for the elasticity of the average cost
curves for the Canadian manufacturing indus-
tries are used. These parameters play a key role
in determining numerous results such as the
potential gains from the reallocation of produc-
tive resources and the degree of increased sales
in U.S. markets.
~An additional incentive noted by Wonnacott (1987) for
diversified, small scale production is caused by Canadian
exposure to U.S. advertising that reinforces Canadian de-
mand for a wide range of products.
24A fundamental problem with this assumption is that,
because firms do not make profits in this model, there is
no incentive to collude,
25This general description is only suggestive of the general
tendency for firm output to expand. With Canadian
resources fixed and numerous relative price changes, the
output of each and every firm will not have risen when the
new equilibrium is attained.
ZtAdditional details on the calibration of the model can be
found in Cox and Harris (1985).A fifth set of parameters is the trade policy
parameters. Foreign and Canadian tariffs, as
well as tariff equivalents of some non-tariff bar-
riers, are used.
Cox and Harris (1986) estimate that the elimi-
nation of all barriers to bilateral trade results in
Canadian welfare gains of 8.74 percent relative
to its gross domestic product (see table 3). They
argue that this large gain is due to the preferen-
tial access to the U.S. market that Canadian pro-
ducers will receive. As a small country, Canada
benefits because the source of U.S. imports is
diverted from other countries to Canada.27 The
Canadian benefits of this diversion are magni-
fied because of the assumed economies of scale
in Canadian manufacturing.
Another study of the agreement that incor-
porated scale economies was done by Wigle
(1988). Despite incorporating similar features to
those used by Cox and Harris, Wigle did not
find large Canadian gains. As shown in table 3,
Wigle estimates that the bilateral abolition of
tariffs produces a slight reduction in Canadian
welfare, 0.05 percent relative to its gross
domestic product. Meanwhile, U.S. welfare in-
creased by 0.06 percent relative to its gross
domestic product. The sharp contrast between
his results and those of Cox and Harris caused
Wigle to explore the specific features of the two
models that were responsible for the very dif-
ferent conclusions.
Cox and Harris combined the two assumptions
about price-setting behavior—monopolistic com-
petitive pricing and collusive pricing—by assum-
ing that prices are set as a weighted average of
the prices set by these methods. Wigle, on the
other hand, assumed that all firms in the non-
mechanical manufacturing sector used monopo-
listic competitive pricing, while firms in the
equipment and vehicles sector used collusive
pricing. According to Wigle, the differences in
the pricing assumptions are negligible, and
changes in them did not eliminate the difference
in his and Cox and Harris’ results.
Differences in the assumed values of trade
elasticities, on the other hand, can produce sub-
stantively different results. Since Cox and Harris
used much higher price elasticities of export
supply and import demand for both Canada and
the United States, Wigle reestimated his model
using trade elasticities that were approximately
twice as high as he used originally. In addition,
he introduced capital mobility between Canada
and the United States; this feature was used by
Cox and Harris. These features did make Wigle’s
amended results closer to those of Cox and
Harris; however, the latter’s results were still
twice as large as Wigle’s new ones.
Wigle speculates that the rest of the differ-
ence between the results in these two studies
are produced by two other factors. First, Cox
and Harris assumed higher values for econo-
mies of scale; the greater economies of scale in-
crease the welfare gains because the economy
will become more specialized.28 Second, Wigle us-
ed two manufacturing industries in his model,
while Cox and Harris used 20. Disaggregated
models may generate larger efficiency gains than
more aggregated ones, because there is more
scope for reallocating resources across industries.
While both the Cox and Harris and the Wigle
models stress the role of economies of scale,
Brown and Stern (1989) estimated a model with
imperfectly competitive industries, but without
economies of scale. Their model addresses criti-
cisms that can be raised about previous models.
Brown and Stern ruled out economies of scale
in their model because they doubted its signifi-
cance for Canada. Canadian firms, because of
already low U.S. tariffs, had access to the U.S.
market. Thus, they argue, gains from the inter-
industry reallocation of resources are likely to
be more important than intra-industry changes.
The Cox and Harris and Wigle models also in-
corporated collusive pricing. Given this assump-
tion, trade liberalization causes increased output
per firm. Brown and Stern suggest, however,
that a collusive market structure is not likely to
persist in the face of free entry. They also point
out that market structures in Canada, as well as
the United States, show much more variety than
has been assumed in previous models. As a re-
27With bilateral free trade, the proportion of total Canadian
trade accounted for by the United States rises from 71
percent to 76 percent. The volume of Canadian trade with
the United States increases by more than 97 percent.
28Wonnacoft (1987) notes that Cox and Harris did not make
independent estimates of the economies of scale, but
rather relied on previous estimates based on econometric
and engineering studies. He notes that many econometric
issues remain unsettled and that the engineering
estimates are likely biased upward.suit, Brown and Stern incorporate a variety of
imperfectly competitive market structures into
their analysis that do not rely on what they
view as questionable assumptions about firm
behavior.
Like the previously discussed Brown and Stern
(1987) study, the model uses four countries and
29 industries, 22 tradeable and seven non-trade-
able. Each industry is characterized by one of
five market structures: perfect competition; mo-
nopolistic competition with free entry; monopo-
listic competition without entry; market segmen-
tation with free entry; and market segmentation
without entry.
Both perfectly competitive and monopolistical-
ly competitive industries are characterized by
product differentiation. Product differentiation
by country applies to perfectly competitive in-
dustries, while products are differentiated by
firms in monopolistically competitive industries.
Perfectly competitive firms determine their
profit-maximizing output levels by setting price
equal to marginal cost, while monopolistically
competitive firms maximize profits by setting
price as a mark-up over marginal cost.
Homogeneous (that is, identical) products are
assumed for the remaining imperfectly com-
petitive industries that are characterized by
market segmentation. With segmented markets
and each firm producing the same product with-
in an industry, all firms selling to consumers in
a specific country must charge the same price,
though this price may vary across countries.
Each firm, assuming that output by other firms
is fixed, establishes a profit-maximizing price for
each national market.
Equilibrium in each industry is characterized
by zero profits. With free entry, the number of
firms in equilibrium assures that price equals
average total cost. For market structures with-
out entry, the number of firms remains cons-
tant. Equilibrium prices are determined in world
markets. Tariffs and exchange rates connect the
equilibrium prices to the prices paid by con-
sumers and received by sellers in the individual
regions.
As shown in table 3, the welfare conse-
quences of the bilateral elimination of tariffs are
small. Canadian welfare rises by $2 billion, which
is 1 percent of its gross domestic product in
1976. U.S. welfare rises as well, but only by
$1.6 billion, 0.09 percent of U.S. gross domestic
product in 1976.
Quantitative models produce conflicting re-
sults about the economic effects of the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement. Results for the
United States range from small negative to small
positive effects on welfare, while results for
Canada range from small negative to large posi-
tive effects. The conflicting results emerge both
from different assumptions about market struc-
tures and the values of certain parameters as-
sociated with supply and demand and from dif-
ferences in the level of detail as to commodities
and countries. Since there is no consensus
about the “best” assumptions, and because inter-
national trade theory provides no definitive con-
clusion about a nation’s welfare following the
formation of a free trade area, it is important
that users of these models understand the rea-
sons for their conflicting results.
Since the assumption of perfectiy competitive
markets throughout all sectors of all countries
is unlikely to hold, the incorporation of im-
perfectly competitive markets is a promising
development. Models that incorporate such mar-
kets raise a number of problems, however, be-
cause of the various pricing assumptions that
have been used and the need for characterizing
the extent of the economies of scale. These
newer models are also more sensitive to the
values chosen for the parameters than those
based on perfect competition.
Perhaps just as important, several key aspects
of the agreement are not included in these
models because they are extremely difficult to
quantify. These unmeasured aspects may be
more important than the measured ones in
terms of the final outcomes. Changes in the
rules and procedures governing international
trade and investment can yield large benefits
that are not included in these models. For ex-
ample, many Canadians believe that secure ac-
cess to the U.S. market is essential for Canadian
economic prosperity. Consequently, the Cana-
dian assessment of the desirability of the agree-
ment might hinge on whether or not the agree-
ment provides this security. Analogously, the
precedent-setting aspects of the agreement con-
cerning services are likely to influence the U.S.
assessment of the benefits of this agreement.Thus, quantitative estimates derived from models
are simply some of the many pieces of informa-
tion that are useful in the decision process and,
in some cases, may not represent the most im-
portant pieces.
Quantitative trade models have improved sub-
stantially in recent years. Nevertheless, as this
review points out, let the user beware.
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